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This paper examines congressional spending preferences over time by party and cham-
ber. The data employed is the annual vote index compiled by the National Taxpayers
Union for 1979-2002. NTU scores are presented with and without adjusting for inter-
chamber and intertemporal movements of the policy space over which the scores are
calculated. Results indicate that the parties and chambers are much more stable over
time, and exhibit a slighter liberal trend, with adjustments for movements in the policy
space. In addition, during ¯scal milestones the adjusted scores indicate less pronounced
changes in spending preferences than the unadjusted data do.
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Congress plays a pivotal role in determining the ¯scal outcomes that motivate a range
of issues in public ¯nance and political economics. Regarding budget de¯cits and public
debt, for example, scholars and commentators routinely point out that the president sets
the budget along with Congress. But when making comparisons over time|perhaps to
explain growing de¯cits, for example|attention is usually focused on the executive branch
and external circumstances such as war and spending emergencies (e.g., natural disasters,
¯nancial bailouts). Observers are inclined also to decry certain budget items that seem to
serve narrow or low-priority interests such as pork-barrel projects. Relatively little attention
is given to the tendencies toward more or less ¯scal restraint over time within Congress.
Certain studies have examined voting on ¯scal issues by individual legislators over their
careers (Aka et al. 1996; Reed et al. 1998), but there is a dearth of work examining the
aggregate ¯scal preferences of parties and chambers, in order to give a sense of how the ¯scal
preferences of the congressional body have changed over time. Such a pro¯le o®ers insight
into issues in addition to the budget, such as the growth of government, ¯scal federalism,
and macroeconomic stabilization policy.
In this paper, I present the ¯scal pro¯le of Congressional parties and chambers from
1979 through 2002 using the index of roll call votes compiled annually by the National
Taxpayers Union, a non-pro¯t research and advocacy organization based in Washington,
D.C. Due to the nature of calculating NTU scores, adjustments must be made in order to
draw intertemporal and interchamber comparisons.1 In general, the adjusted data indicate
much less volatility and a slighter liberal trend than do the nominal data among party and
chamber mean ¯scal policy positions. In addition, during ¯scal milestones the adjusted
scores indicate less pronounced changes in spending preferences than the unadjusted data
do.
1The transformation is analogous to adjusting nominal data for in°ation over time and for cross-sectional
purchasing power di®erences.
12 Description of the Data
NTU scores are an annual index of individual legislators' roll call voting records on ¯s-
cal matters. Similar types of \watchdog" indices are calculated each year by many other
groups. NTU scores are unique among these indices by the way the issue set is de¯ned
and weighted. A typical watchdog group selects a series of major votes each year, adopts a
position on each vote, and assigns each member a score based on the frequency of support-
ing the group's position. In contrast, the NTU incorporates every vote that has an e®ect
on federal spending, taxes, federal debt, or certain types of regulation. Each vote is then
assigned a weight based on the magnitude its ¯scal e®ect. A legislator's NTU score in a
given year is the weighted frequency with which he/she voted to reduce, or not to increase,
spending or taxes. The score's range is 0 to 100, with a higher score indicating more ¯scal
restraint in the voting record.
Table 1 provides a summary of the manner in which NTU scores have been calculated
since their inception in 1979 through 2002. On average, the scores include 197 votes from
the House °oor, and 153 from the Senate °oor, each year. Weighting the scores began in
1985, and there is a subjective element in assigning the weights since they are done mostly
by NTU sta®. The sample includes a score for every representative and senator during the
24-year period considered, amounting to 12,810 scores.2
3 Initial View
Figure 1 shows the mean NTU scores for the House and Senate, and for Republicans and
Democrats within the two chambers. Several things are noteworthy here. First, the House
and Senate are remarkably close together; neither seems to be more or less ¯scally conserva-
tive or liberal than the other. Second, Republicans score consistently higher than Democrats
in both the House and Senate; although, for several years in the 1980s the parties were quite
close in the Senate. Figure 1 also presents the polarization of the two parties, calculated
2A surprisingly small number of cells (30) are missing data due to vacancies or excessive absenteeism, in
which case the NTU does not record a score.
2simply as the Republican mean minus the Democrat mean. Here we see some con¯rmation
of the scholarly and popular wisdom that the parties are becoming more polarized over time
(Pool and Rosenthal 1991; Grofman et al. 2001; L¶ opez and Ramrez 2004). In particular,
Senate polarization on ¯scal voting increases ¯ve-fold between 1991 and 1993, and increases
further from there. House polarization increases with similar magnitude beginning in 1989,
though it settles down somewhat after 1995. Next, these ¯gures seem to re°ect certain
milestones in recent congressional history. For example, the 1994 "Republican revolution"
is evident in the House and Senate panel, as well as in the Republican lines within the
separate party panels|though one can see that the Republican numbers began to increase
in 1991. However, the ¯gures also suggest puzzling changes occurring without a ¯scal mile-
stone. For example, in 1988, the last year of the Reagan presidency, both the House and
Senate appear to drop signi¯cantly toward ¯scal largess. But there was no major tax bill
in that year, and the budget de¯cit in nominal dollars was already shrinking from its high
in 1986. It is not clear|from President Reagan's 1988 budget proposal, for example|that
the stock market crash of 1987 led to major ¯scal policy changes. Furthermore, nothing in
the NTU's 1988 study indicates a rationale for why the scores are much lower in that year
than in neighboring years. Such apparent anomalies may be simply due to the fact that
hundreds of votes are considered, and no single issue is given su±cient weight in order to
a®ect appreciably even an individual's score, much less a party or chamber mean. However,
there is a deeper issue at hand in making these comparisons across time and chamber.
4 Shifting and Stretching the Policy Space
Vote indices such as NTU scores are based on an underlying policy space, which depends on
the set of votes in a given year that is used to calculate the index. Only ¯scal matters that
advance to the ¯nal °oor voting stage are considered in the NTU index. The set of ¯scal
issues brought to °oor votes changes from year to year, and it also di®ers across chambers in
a given year|both of which are evident in Table 1. Furthermore, the subjective weighting
process also changes over time due to the addition of new sta® assigning the weights under
evolving procedures. These aspects together mean that the underlying space is not stable
3over years or between House and Senate, so the nominal NTU scores cannot be compared
across time or chamber.
According to Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999), the policy spaces underlying watch-
dog group scores \shift" and \stretch" when the set of votes on which the scores are based
changes. This can cause spurious changes in the vote index.
To illustrate the problem in the case of NTU scores, assume each representative and
senator has an ideal policy outcome over all conceivable ¯scal issues. Assume further that
ideal points are ¯xed, so that a measure of each member's ¯scal policy position would re-
main unchanged for that member over time. If the set of votes used to compute the index
shifts, members' scores will change even though their true positions are ¯xed. Suppose,
for example, that from period t ¡ 1 to period t the chair of the budget committee changes
hands from a ¯scal conservative to a ¯scal liberal, so that a series of larger than previous
spending increases are reported to the °oor. Fewer members will vote for these measures
than previously, and those who vote against will receive greater NTU scores, so the chamber
will appear to become more ¯scally restrained in period t. Following Groseclose, Levitt, and
Snyder (1999), this spurious increase can be corrected by a simple counter shift parameter|
call it at|subtracted from a member's score in magnitude commensurate with the degree
of the shift in policy space.
A similar problem can occur if the space stretches. Suppose a new presidency ushers in
a period of divided government, and perhaps the spending priorities di®er greatly between
congressional leaders and the administration|or perhaps for de¯cit reduction one group
wants to increase taxes and the other pushes to decrease spending. Under such a scenario,
the set of °oor votes on ¯scal policy will have greater variance. Members away from the
center will change votes, and the distribution of NTU scores will diminish. Depending
on majority-minority shares of seats, and the concentration of ideal points by party, this
could lead to even major changes in party and chamber means (Merrill et al. 1999). Again
following Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999), the scores can be adjusted by a stretch
4parameter|call it bt|which is inversely related to the magnitude of the stretch in scale.3
The shift and scale adjustments amount to a linear transformation as follows. If the
kth member in chamber i has NTU score ykit in period t, then the adjusted NTU score
is ^ ykit =
ykit¡^ at
^ bt
, where the parameter estimates ^ ait and ^ bit for each chamber-year can be
obtained using maximum likelihood as detailed in Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999).
The shift and scale parameter estimates for House and Senate NTU scores appear in the
Appendix.4
5 Adjusted View
Figure 2 contains the nominal and adjusted mean NTU scores for chambers over time.
Compared to nominal, the adjusted scores exhibit a remarkable degree of stability in both
the House and Senate.5 Thus, seemingly large year-to-year changes in the nominal data are
determined mostly by movements of the policy space. In the House there is one relatively
large upward movement following the 1994 elections. The increase from 1994 to 1995 is
more than 10 percent of the mean and is a larger change than in any other year. The
Senate, while also stable over the long term, appears to be relatively conservative during
most of the Reagan years, then dips down between 1987 and 1994, and then again re°ects
greater ¯scal restraint with the Republican majority that began in 1995. Overall, the House
and Senate are very close together, with the Senate being slightly more ¯scally conservative
in most years. The e®ect of the shift and scale parameters can be seen by comparing the
year-to-year changes in the nominal and adjusted scores. For example, from 1994 to 1995,
the nominal House mean increased by 15.12 percent, but the real score increased by only
3It is not necessary to assume legislators' policy positions are ¯xed. If the scale shifts and/or stretches
relative to even a moving ideal point, the unadjusted NTU scores will still overstate the degree of movement
in the ideal point.
4Tim Groseclose provided the program code for conducting the estimations in an old version of the
computational software Matlab. The estimates appearing in the Appendix to this paper were obtained
using a variant of the older code that was updated for use in a newer version of Matlab. We ¯rst replicated
Groseclose's estimates for ADA scores, then proceeded to estimate the parameters for the NTU data. Full
details are available on request.
5This also contrasts with a high degree of °uctuation in both nominal and adjusted measures of voting
on a broader issue set, such as ADA scores (Groseclose et al. 1999; Grofman et al. 2001).
510.2 percent. Thus, the movement of the policy space explains roughly 4.9 percent of the
apparent trend toward ¯scal conservatism after the Republicans won the majority in the
House.
The adjusted scores also indicate much less polarization than do the nominal scores, par-
ticularly after about 1990. While there is certainly some upward drift in both the House and
Senate, a great deal of the apparent polarization can be attributed to changes in the issues
that are put to °oor votes. In 1993 through 1995 in particular, the ^ bt parameter estimates in
the Appendix suggest that the set of votes brought to the House °oor had greater variance
than in the preceding and following years. This would explain the dramatic increase in po-
larization within the nominal scores, but a relatively smaller increase in the adjusted scores.
The individual parties are pro¯led in Figure 3. Here again we see that the adjusted scores
show greater stability, while still indicating that the Republicans are becoming slightly more
¯scally conservative over time while the Democrats move slightly in the opposite direction.
Interestingly, the \dip" that occurred in 1988 can still be seen in the adjusted scores for
Senate parties. Republicans show about an 8 percent decrease (toward ¯scally liberal) in
1988 followed by a 6.5 percent increase in 1989. Senate Democrats experienced a 1.2 percent
increase in 1988 followed by an almost 10 percent decrease in 1989. So even after adjusting
for a changing policy space, there was a one-year move among senators toward the center
on ¯scal policy matters. The previous presidential election year, 1984, saw an even greater
decrease in polarization in the Senate.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper presents a view of House and Senate voting on ¯scal policy issues over time. The
data used are the annual index of budget and tax votes calculated by the National Taxpay-
ers Union, after adjusting for movements in the policy space across time and chamber. In
addition to showing that the House and Senate exhibit nearly the same mean ¯scal policy
position over time, the analysis indicates that there is remarkable stability over time for
6Congress as a whole|with the exceptions of select milestone years such as the 1988 budget
de¯cit debate and 1995 when Republicans gained majorities in both chambers for the ¯rst
time in four decades. However, relatively large changes can bee seen in the polarization
data since the late 1980s, indicating that Republicans have drifted toward ¯scal restraint
and Democrats toward ¯scal loosening in both the House and Senate. These results can
be used to analyze issues in public ¯nance and political economy such as debt and de¯cits,
growth in government, ¯scal federalism, and macroeconomic policy, as well as presidential-
congressional relations. Political economists will also be interested in the shift and stretch
parameter estimates to draw inferences regarding congressional leaders and movements of
the policy space|for example, in models of agenda setting power.
A natural extension of this paper is to focus attention on adjusted NTU scores among
congressional leaders, since their ¯scal policy positions largely determine which issues are
brought to votes. In addition, considering medians rather than means may a®ord greater
applicability in spatial models of political economy that are based on median tendencies.
Also, since growing de¯cits have become more of an issue of debate under President George
W. Bush, it will be of interest to incorporate data through 2008, and calculate the adjusted
scores, once the data becomes available. Finally, previous research that has used nominal
NTU scores (e.g., Aka et al. 1996, Reed et al. 1998) could be revisited to investigate
whether adjusting the scores for moving issue sets would alter results.
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12Appendix: Shift and Stretch Parameter Estimates
for Adjusting NTU Scores Across Time and Chamber
House Senate
Year a b a b
1979 -0.672 1.488 -2.0273 1.3174
1980 -5.7617 1.5826 5.8251 1.217
1981 10.7679 1.0884 11.938 1.2213
1982 -1.8634 1.4776 7.5649 1.2087
1983 -14.5767 1.9186 7.82 1.0833
1984 0.7821 1.3174 36.1213 0.3801
1985 10.875 1.1933 4.4456 1.2889
1986 4.2008 1.2576 29.267 0.5578
1987 -2.5311 1.4407 11.5739 1.0179
1988 0 1 8.0299 0.6583
1989 19.7176 0.814 23.3209 0.6649
1990 -10.0705 1.5875 18.0477 0.612
1991 -9.7982 1.5678 16.0667 0.6093
1992 -4.167 1.8525 -2.0819 1.5706
1993 -19.9375 2.2963 -24.7309 2.3754
1994 -21.1225 2.3141 -19.1838 1.9775
1995 -12.946 2.3275 -27.5811 2.6662
1996 12.6793 1.365 -7.5856 1.9053
1997 5.6619 1.255 -18.6254 2.2651
1998 -9.7984 1.628 -27.4744 2.1737
1999 -9.9646 1.6932 -44.7136 2.8273
2000 -1.4255 1.5679 -35.4712 2.5918
2001 -21.3921 2.0699 -45.1818 2.9878
2002 -2.9647 1.4622 -20.4605 1.9688
Notes: a is shift parameter and b is stretch parameter. See text for details.
13